IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
MARTIN LINDSTEDT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 97-5064-CV-SW-1
)
JASPER COUNTY, MISSOURI, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant the Honorable Joseph Schoeberl's
motion to dismiss this case pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) or Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Martin Lindstedt, pro se, has
filed a response to this motion, which the Court also considers in
reaching its decision. For the reasons stated below, Schoeberl's
motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court takes the allegations of the complaint as true, as it must
upon a motion to dismiss. In his complaint Lindstedt alleges that Judge
Schoeberi ordered several Jasper County, Missouri, sheriff's deputies to
arrest Lindstedt and hold him for safe keeping for twelve hours in jail.
This occurred on June 30, 1995, when Lindstedt had gone to the Jasper
County, courthouse to file jury instructions regarding an unrelated case.
Lindstedt asserts that upon leaving the courthouse he was detained by
several officers who questioned him about causing problems in the
courthouse. Lindstedt further asserts that while in the courthouse he
was not violating the law in any way, nor was he disturbing the peace,
nor was he intoxicated. Finally, Lindstedt alleges that Judge
Schoeberl ordered
Document #17
these deputies to take him to jail and detain him for twelve hours in
violation of his constitutional rights. Lindstedt maintains that he was
held pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 67.3 15, which allows an
officer to detain an individual who appears to be intoxicated for up to
twelve hours. Lindstedt contends that, since he was sober at the time
he was detained, the relevant individuals simply used this statute as a
pretext to act illegally. Lindstedt has brought suit against these
individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lindstedt seeks to recover real
and punitive damages from Judge Schoeberl.
II. DISCUSSION
Judge Schoeberl moves to have the case against him dismissed under
either 28 U.S.C. §1915(d) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Both of these arguments are based upon the premise that Lindstedt may
not maintain a suit against Judge Schoeberl in this case because a judge
is entitled to absolute civil immunity.
A. Dismissal of Frivolous Claims
Schoeberl correctly asserts that pro se complaints which have been
filed in forma pauperis may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) if
the court is satisfied that the cause is "frivolous." This inquiry,
however, should occur at the same time that the court determines whether
the plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis. Martin-Trigona v. Stewart,
691 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 1982). Such an inquiry did occur in this
case. In its Order of August 7, 1997, the Court held that this case was
not frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). (1) In light of the Court's
decision regarding Judge
----------------------
1 The Court notes that Local Rule 87.3(a)(6) allows it to
review Plaintiffs in forma pauperis status and rescind that
status at any time when the party becomes capable of paying the
complete filing fee or if the court determines the case is
frivolous, or if the court determines that
2
Schoeberl's motion to dismiss it is unnecessary to reconsider
that decision.
B. Failure to State a Claim
In considering whether to dismiss a case for its failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court assumes the truth
of all facts alleged in the complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the complainant. Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151,
152 (8th Cir. 1993). The claim is dismissed when the moving party
shows "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
WMX Technologies. Inc. v. Gasconade County Mo., 105 F.3d 1195, 1198
(8th Cir. 1997) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78
S. Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). In making this analysis,
the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts
that the plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual
allegations. Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1982).
As a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to
be granted only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes
allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some
insuperable bar to relief. Id. (quoting Jackson Sawmill Co., Inc.
v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1978), cert denied,
439 U.S. 1070, 99 5. Ct. 839, 59 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1979)).
A defendant's absolute immunity from suit presents an insuperable
bar to relief such that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.
Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity provides
immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
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the applicant has willfully misstated information in the application
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis." See. e.g., Cross v.
General Motors Corp., 721 F.2d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U S. 980 (1984).
3
______________________________________________________________________
U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed. 2d 411(1985).
Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad
faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved
without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967)
("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 815-819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736-39, 73 L. Ed.2d 396 (1982) (finding
allegations of malice insufficient to overcome qualified immunity).
Rather, the Supreme Court has indicated that immunity is overcome
in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from
liability for nonjudicial actions i.e., actions not taken in the
judge's judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29,
108 S. Ct. 538, 544-45, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1106, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331(1978). Second, a
judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at
1104-05; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646(1872).
The Court concludes Judge Schoeberl's actions were taken in his
judicial capacity. The Supreme Court in Stump made it clear that
"whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate[s] to the nature
of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." 435 U.S. at 362,
98 S. Ct. at 1108. See also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-29, 108
S.Ct. at 544-45.
Of course, a judge's direction to police officers to arrest a
sober individual for appearing intoxicated is not a "function
normally performed by a judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362,
98 5. Ct. at 1108. But if only the particular act in question were
to be scrutinized, then any mistake
4
of a judge in excess of his authority would become a "nonjudicial"
act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be
normally performed by a judge. If judicial immunity means anything,
it means that a judge "will not be deprived of immunity because the
action he took was in error... or was in excess of his authority." Id.
at 356, 98 S.Ct. at 1105. See also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108
S.Ct. at 544 (holding that a judicial act "does not become less
judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of
motive"). Accordingly, as the language in Stump indicates, the
relevant inquiry is the "nature" and "function" of the act, not the
"act itself." 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1108. In other words, we
look to the particular act's relation to a general function normally
performed by a judge, in this case the function of directing police
officers to remove an individual from the courthouse who appeared to
be intoxicated.
Nor does the fact that Judge Schoeberl's order was carried out by
police officers somehow transform his action from "judicial" to
"executive" in character. As Forrester instructs, it is "the nature
of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed
it, that inform[s] our immunity analysis." 484 U.S. at 229, 108 S.Ct.
at 545. A judge's direction to an executive officer to remove a person
from the courthouse is no more executive in character than a judge's
issuance of a warrant for an executive officer to search a home. See
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1941, 114 L. Ed. 2d
547 (1991) ("[T]he issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a
judicial act"). The Court also finds that even if Schoeberl did order
the deputies to arrest Lindstedt under Missouri Revised Statute §
67.315, such an act would be a judicial act. In this case Lindstedt
entered the courthouse of his own volition, it is certainly a
judicial act for a judge to direct courthouse deputies or officers to
enforce the state laws against those who are in the courthouse.
Judges are not immune from lawsuits based on actions taken in the
complete absence of all
5
jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 5. Ct. 286, 288,
116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (per curium). An act in excess of jurisdiction
will not deprive a judge of immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 5. Ct.
at 1105 (1978). A distinction thus exists between acts performed in
excess of jurisdiction and those done in the absence ofjurisdiction.
Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994). As to
the former, a 'judge acts in excess ofjurisdiction if the act
complained of is within his general power ofjurisdiction but is not
authorized because of certain circumstances." Billingsley v. Kyser,
691 F.2d 388, 389 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curium). As to the latter,
"there is a clear absence ofjurisdiction when a court of limited
jurisdiction attempts to adjudicate a case outside of its jurisdiction,
such as when a probate court conducts a criminal trial." Mann v.
Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 104(6th Cir.) (internal quotation omitted),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 870, 115 5. Ct. 193, 130 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1994).
A judge's direction to order a person held for twelve hours
"safekeeping," is within a judge's jurisdiction. See generally
Missouri's Revised Statutes § 67.315. (2) Nor does it matter
whether Judge Schoeberl acted as a Circuit Judge or as an Associate
Circuit Judge. (3)
------------------------
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 67.315 (1989) provides:
(1) A person who appears to be incapacitated or
intoxicated may be taken by a peace officer to the person's
residence, to any available treatment service, or to any
other appropriate local facility, which may if necessary
include a jail, for custody not to exceed twelve hours.
3 "Originally, § 478.220 provided that '[C]ircuit judges
may hear and determine all cases and matters within the
jurisdiction of their circuit courts....' § 478.220 (RSMo 1986).
Now § 478.220 reads '[C]ircuit judges and associate circuit
judges may hear and determine all cases and matters within the
jurisdiction of their circuit courts ...' (emphasis added). §
478.220 (RSMo 1994). Thus, associate circuit judges now have
concurrent original jurisdiction of all causes heard by circuit
judges, with no monetary limitation." Harvey v. Village of
Hillsdale, 893 S.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). See also Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 541.015 (1987) "Associate circuit judges may hear
and determine originally, with circuit judges, coextensive with
their respective counties, all cases of misdemeanor and infractions
as otherwise provided by law."
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The Court finds that it is certainly within a judge's
discretion to direct judicial officers to uphold the law within
his or her courthouse. Having a person removed from a courtroom
because they are causing a disturbance, irrespective of whether
they are a party to a specific dispute, is still a judicial act.
The act becomes no less judicial and no less entitled to immunity
because the judge overreacted in determining that the person was
causing a disturbance.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Judge
Schoeberl is entitled to absolute immunity for his acts.
Accordingly, Lindstedt has failed to state a claim against this
defendant upon which relief may be granted. Defendant Schoeberl's
motion to dismiss this case is therefore
GRANTED.
-s- Dean Whipple
_____________________________
Dean Whipple
United States District Judge
Date Nov. 18, 1997
_____________
7
.
Comment: Of the lot of federal judges I have on my cases, Dean Whipple is by far the most intelligent. Ortrie Smith is a wimp who shoves it up to the appeals courts to sort out. D. Brook Bartlett thinks "D." stands for deity, and since he is the closest thing to God on earth, usually ignores what the laws say regardless. Whipple knows the law the best, but that usually means that he is far better at misquoting it..So when I got this, I knew that the proper procedure was to file a Rule 59 and Rule 60 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Motion to Reconsider. By filing it on the 10th day, I ensure an appeal to the federal court system if the judge refuses to reconsider his decision.
It is a staple of the federal judiciary that it must always rule a state judge immune from a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, using whatever excuse is necessary. Their brethren of the bar must always be above the law, otherwise, their own immunity from prosecution will be endangered.
A civil-rights lawsuit is the only peaceful solution for reining in the misconduct of government officials. A suit for monetary damages against the criminal officials and the government unit is the only way to deter their misconduct. Yet, time after time, these government criminals and their criminal gubbnments are ruled "immune from suit" contrary to the plain language of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the federal judiciary. Thus for all practical purposes, peaceful methods to ensure government responsibility and accountability for its actions are curtailed. The King is above the law. With that attitude, tyranny and regicide become the order of the day, as the only guarantor of justice is the willingness to use violence to gain justice.
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