IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
MARTIN LINDSTEDT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. ) No. 97-5064-CV-SW-1
)
JASPER COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al, )
)
Defendants )
ORDER
Pending before this Court is Defendants Pierce, Gilbert, and
Blauckat's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. Defendants Gilbert and Blauckat move for summary judgment
alleging that they are immune from suit because they are entitled to
qualified immunity for their acts. Defendant Price also moves for summary
judgment on the grounds that respondeat superior is not actionable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action involves Plaintiff Lindstedt's arrest at
the Jasper County, Missouri courthouse. For the reasons stated below,
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Defendants Gilbert
and Blauckat and DENIED as to Defendant Pierce.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court looks at the facts and allegations in the light most
favorable to Lindstedt, as it must upon a motion for summary judgment. In
his complaint, Lindstedt alleges that Judge Schoeberl ordered several
Jasper County, Missouri sheriff's deputies to arrest and hold him for safe
keeping for twelve hours in jail. This occurred on June 30, 1995, when
Lindstedt had gone to the Jasper County, courthouse to file jury instructions
regarding an unrelated case. Lindstedt asserts that upon leaving
Document # 16
the courthouse he was detained by several officers, including Gilbert and
Blauckat, who questioned him about causing problems in the courthouse.
Lindstedt asserts that while in the courthouse, he was not violating the
law in any way, nor was he disturbing the peace, nor was he intoxicated.
Finally, Lindstedt alleges that Judge Schoeberi ordered these deputies to
take him to jail and detain him for twelve hours in violation of his
constitutional rights. Lindstedt maintains that he was held pursuant to
Missouri Revised Statute § 67.315, which allows an officer to detain an
individual who appears to be intoxicated for up to twelve hours. Lindstedt
contends that, since he was sober at the time he was detained, the relevant
individuals simply used this statute as a pretext to act illegally.
Lindstedt seeks to recover real and punitive damages from the Defendants.
II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A movant is entitled to summary judgment if there is "no genuine
issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P.56(c). The moving party bears
the burden of proof. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Great Nat'l Corp., 818 F.2d
19, 20 (8th Cir. 1987). When considering a motion for summary judgment,
a court must scrutinize the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and "give [the nonmoving party] the benefit of all
reasonable inferences." Mirax Chem. Prods. Corp v. First Interstate
Commercial Corp., 950 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1991).
Once the moving party discharges its initial burden, the nonmoving
party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse
party's pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(e). The moving
party may not "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts." Matsushita Electric
2
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348,
1355-56, 89 L. Ed2d 538 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
Lindstedt argues that officers Gilbert and Blauckat violated his civil
rights by arresting him pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 67.315 on June 30,
1995. Sheriff Pierce is also being sued by Lindstedt, not for his actual
participation in the arrest of Lindstedt because he was not present at the
Jasper County, Missouri courthouse at that time, but for his policy-making
roll regarding the activities of Jasper County Sheriff's Department
deputies. Gilbert and Blauckat assert that they are immune from suit on
the basis of qualified immunity, and Pierce claims that suit against him
may not be predicated on the basis of respondeat superior. These arguments
are addressed in turn by the Court.
A. Qualified Immunity of Officers Gilbert and Blauckat
"It is well settled that law enforcement officials who 'reasonably
but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present' are entitled to
immunity." Johnson v. Scheiderheinz, 102 F.3d 340, 341 (8th Cir 1996)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039,
97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)). Government officials are qualifiedly immune
from liability in civil actions to the extent their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818, 102 5. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). The qualified
immunity defense protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106
S.Ct. 1092,1096, 89 L.Ed. 2d 271 (1986). Therefore, if an officer acts in
a manner about which officers of reasonable competence could disagree,
the officer should be immune from liability. Id.
3
Accordingly, in § 1983 cases involving charges of improper arrest, the
Eighth Circuit has held that "[t]he issue for immunity purposes is not
probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause." Myers v. Morris, 810
F.2d 1437, 1455 (8th Cir.1987); see also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d
289, 295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied __ U.S. __ 117 S.Ct. 518, 136 L.Ed.
2d 407 (1996).
In Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1994), the
Eighth Circuit explained that the rationale for the qualified immunity
doctrine:
is to allow public officers to carry out their duties as
they think right, rather than acting out of fear for their
own personal fortunes. Toward this end, the rule has
evolved that an official performing discretionary
functions will generally be immune from liability unless a
reasonable person in his position would have known that his
actions violated clearly established law.
Id. at 1351 (citations omitted). Officers Gilbert and Blauckat are
therefore immune from Lindstedt's suit unless, "first, the law [they]
violated was clearly established at the time of the violation, and second,
the applicability of the law to [their] particular action was evident." Id.
Lindstedt contends that he was arrested and detained illegally by
officers Gilbert and Blauckat. To avoid qualified immunity, the asserted
rights must have been clearly established at the time as constitutional
rights, and not just as rights arising under the common law, administrative
regulations, or even codified statutes. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.
183, 193-97, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3018-20, 82 L.Ed. 2d 139 (1984); accord St.
Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 27-28 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 2548, 135 L.Ed. 2d 1068 (1996). The right
to be free from arrest without probable cause and illegal detention are
clearly established constitutional rights. A reasonable officer knows that
he or she may not make an arrest without probable cause. There is no
right, however, not to be arrested, even if you have not committed a
crime. This case, therefore, turns on the issue of probable cause.
4
The Court must determine whether the Defendants "arguably had probable
cause" to arrest Lindstedt. See Johnson, 102 F.3d at 341. Lindstedt was
detained pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 67.315, which provides:
1. A person who appears to be incapacitated or
intoxicated may be taken by a peace officer to the
person's residence, to any available treatment
service, or to any other appropriate local facility,
which may if necessary include a jail, for custody
not to exceed twelve hours.
2. Any officer detaining such person shall be
immune from prosecution for false arrest and shall
not be responsible in damages for taking action
pursuant to subsection 1 above if the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the person is
incapacitated or intoxicated by alcohol and he does
not use unreasonable excessive force to detain such
person.
3. Such immunity from prosecution includes the
taking of reasonable action to protect himself or
herself from harm by the intoxicated or
incapacitated person.
(emphasis added). This statute grants broad discretion to police officers
who believe that they have come into contact with an individual who is
incapacitated or intoxicated. The statute does not require that a person
be given a breath test or a field sobriety test before the officer takes
the individual to his or her home, a treatment facility, or jail. (1)
While the performance of these tests would certainly go to the
reasonableness of an officers actions, they are not required. Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 67.315 requires that the officers acted reasonably, while the
doctrine of qualified immunity only requires that the officers' actions
did not violate a law about which a reasonable police officer would have
known. In other words, even if other reasonable officers would have
disagreed that Lindstedt appeared intoxicated or incapacitated and even if
Lindstedt was not intoxicated or incapacitated, Gilbert and Blauckat are
entitled to qualified immunity as long as they believed that they were
acting pursuant to the law and there was "arguable probable cause" for them
to arrest Lindstedt.
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1 Lindstedt has not challenged the constitutionality of Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 67.315 and the Court does not address that issue here.
5
The Court, therefore, looks at the circumstances surrounding
Lindstedt's detention not to determine whether actual probable cause
existed to justify his arrest, but to determine whether the officers had
arguable probable cause to make such an arrest. Uncontroverted facts
establish that, at the time of Lindstedt's arrest, the officers were aware
of certain circumstances tending to point toward his intoxication or
incapacitation: (1) Gilbert had been dispatched to the courthouse after the
police department received a call from court personnel regarding a man
creating a disturbance in the Circuit Clerk's Office; (2) the individuals
in the Clerk's Office gave a description matching that of Lindstedt's; (3)
Lindstedt initially failed to produce identification for the officers when
they asked for it; (4) Gilbert was told by individuals in the Clerk's
Office that Lindstedt was very upset and acting "crazy;" (5) Gilbert
indicates that upon encountering Lindstedt, he was requesting that someone
call the police because he was being kidnaped; Lindstedt admits to calling
for help, and calling at passersby that he was being kidnaped by the
police; and (6) Lindstedt admits to having a brusque and abrasive
personality with the courthouse staff whom he "despises." The Court agrees
that such behavior does not appear consistent with someone who is in full
control of his or her faculties.
The Court also agrees with Lindstedt that none of this activity, by
itself, is necessarily illegal. These facts, however, may constitute
probable cause to arrest someone pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 67.315.
Moreover, it is not necessary for this Court to decide whether the facts
support actual probable cause to arrest; the Court simply holds that there
were sufficient undisputed facts and information available to support a
reasonable law enforcement officer's belief that probable cause existed to
arrest Lindstedt pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 67.315. His behavior was
certainly suspect in light of the circumstances, and by his own admission
warranted complaints by all of the people with whom he came into contact
on that afternoon. That the officers may have been mistaken as to
6
whether he was intoxicated or incapacitated is not enough to find a
violation of Lindstedt's constitutional rights. See Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed. 2d 589 (1991). The
qualified immunity doctrine must accommodate for reasonable error because
"'officials should not err always on the side of caution' because they fear
being sued." Id. at 229, 112 S.Ct. at 537 (quoting Davis, 468 U.S. at
196, 104 S. Ct. at 3020).
B. Suit against Sheriff Pierce
Defendant Pierce is correct in asserting that he may not be found
liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of Gilbert
and Blauckat under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Respondeat superior does not apply
under section 1983 because municipal liability is limited to conduct for
which the municipality is itself actually responsible." McGautha v.
Jackson County, Mo. Col. Dept., 36 F.3d 53, 54 (1994) (quoting Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723, 105
L.Ed. 2d 598 (1989); Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691,
98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611(1978)). To the extent that Pierce
may be named in his official capacity as a policy-maker for the Jasper
County, Missouri Sheriff's Department, Lindstedt's claims are not based
solely upon the theory of respondeat superior. The Court notes that
designation of the official or body responsible for the challenged policy
is a matter of state law determined by the court. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737,
109 S.Ct. 2723-24; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124, 108
S.Ct. 915, 924-25, 99 L.Ed. 2d 107 (1988); see also Jane Doe A v. Special
Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990). Since such a defense has
not been raised at this time, the Court does not address whether Pierce has
any responsibility for the challenged policy or actions in the present
case. (2)
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2 The Court also expects that Jasper County itself may
move for summary judgment in this case as discovery progresses.
To the extent that he was acting in his official capacity, it is
likely that Pierce will also be able to assert similar defenses
and claims as the municipality itself
7
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Defendants Gilbert
and Blauckat's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Pierce's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
-s- Dean Whipple
______________________________
Dean Whipple
United States District Judge
Date: Nov. 18, 1997
______________________
8
Comment: In order to create any concealed police state, it is first necessary to have the regime's judicial apparatus make the policemen who enforce the regime's rule immune from the consequences of criminal activity. This case illustrates the judicial rational used to justify a warrantless arrest and imprisonment under color of law while giving a legal 'gloss' to a deliberate false arrest and false imprisonment. By ruling that Deputy Gilbert and Blauckat are immune from their misconduct, Federal Judge Whipple has in effect destroyed my case by letting the main police criminals off the hook while leaving for the sake of appearances a rump suit against Sheriff Pierce. This would allow Whipple to later dismiss the suit against Pierce while at the same time I am appealing his decision against myself in the case of Schoeberl and Deputies Gilbert and Blauckat. Divide and conquer..The appellate courts, and especially the 8th, increasingly erode the paper protections from false arrest and imprisonment contained in the 5th Amendment by extending the qualified immunity of corrupt and incompetent police. Starting with the decision in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, which allowed FBI agents to break into homes and make false arrests and searches, the various circuits have changed the former standard of 'probable cause' to arguable probable cause. Now the federal judge then gets to sit back and argue, like a defense lawyer for the police state, that the standard now is what a 'reasonable' police officer might have done in similar circumstances. Then having ruled that a 'reasonable' police officer might have done the very same thing, the judge declares the police who did do something corrupt or dishonest 'immune' from suit and then dismisses the case. By this means, the matter never comes to trial, the police learn they can do whatever criminal thing they want under color of law, the federal judge screws over the peasantry as just 'part of doing his job,' the private citizen is screwed, and the charade of 'rule of law' is weakened.
All that remains for myself as a plaintiff to do now is to rub Whipple's misstatements of both fact and law in his face by filing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59 and/or Rule 60 Motion to Reconsider. Then he either reconsiders or an appeal is filed to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals.
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